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Air traffic controllers in the Federal Aviation Administration can submit
voluntary safety reports when significant safety concerns and potential safety
events are encountered during their everyday operations. We tested two questions:
Can safety reports be classified according to whether the risk was known or
unknown to the controller or the system; and would classifying reports in this
manner yield useful safety information? A sample of 36 reports was assessed
using this known-unknown method. 55% of the reports were classified as risks
known to the controller but unknown to the system. 17% of the reports were
scored as known to both the controller and the system. 14% were classified as
unknown to the controller but known to the system, and 14% as unknown to both
the controller and the system. Trends, limitations, and next steps are discussed.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) continues in its mission of providing the
safest National Airspace System (NAS) in the world. The Air Traffic Organization (ATO) uses
policy, process, programs, and data to monitor safety in operations consistent with its Safety
Management System (SMS) and includes safety-related performance targets in its annual
business plan. The ATO seeks to mitigate known risks and to uncover unknown risk through its
safety assurance and risk mitigation efforts. One of the avenues the ATO identifies and assesses
risk, and improves safety culture, is through the Air Traffic Safety Action Program (ATSAP).
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has a separate aviation voluntary
safety reporting system called the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) used by pilots,
controllers, and others to report safety concerns and issues (Billings et.al., 1976). A commercial
airline may have its own Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) for a pilot to file a report.
Controller Safety Reporting System
Air traffic controllers in the ATO can submit voluntary safety reports when significant
safety concerns and potential safety events are encountered during their everyday operations
(FAA, 2017). These reports of hazards and risks are processed and, if appropriate, mitigations
are developed and collected as part of safety data. The employee is responsible to ensure that all
occurrences of which they are aware, through either direct involvement or observation, are
reported. All personnel with knowledge of an occurrence are encouraged to report, even if this
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results in multiple submissions of the same occurrence. The Operations Supervisor, Operations
Manager, and controller-in-charge (CIC) must also report occurrences. Reported occurrences are
first reviewed at the facility level as a Mandatory Occurrence Report (MOR), e.g., airborne loss
of separation. Facility points of contact review the MOR for possible inclusion of additional data
before submission to Quality Assurance.
An ATSAP Event Review Committee (ERC) includes a member of FAA’s Air Traffic
Organization Management, a National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA)
representative, and a member of FAA’s Air Traffic Safety Oversight Service. The ERC evaluates
each report submitted and determines if it meets the requirements established through the FAANATCA Memorandum of Understanding. If the report meets the standards prescribed, the ERC
accepts the report and logs it into the ATSAP. During the review process, the ERC also reviews
each report to identify actual or potential safety issues and causal factors.
Between 2008, when ATSAP was established between the FAA and NATCA and 2018
over 160,000 reports were generated (NATCA, 2018). Certain ATSAP reports are shared with
airlines through the Confidential Information Sharing Program (CISP) involving over 28
participants and over 98,000 reports.
By 2018 NATCA indicated there were over 185 formal Corrective Action Requests
(CARs) issued to address serious system safety concerns, of which 112 had been
closed/resolved. At least 805 systemic positive changes had been developed from voluntary
reporting and informal changes taking place at FAA facilities as reported by NATCA (2018).
Reports were used to develop recurrent training curricula and contributed to the development of
the ATO’s Top 5 safety issues. ATSAP Positive reports were use in this study (NATCA, 2015,
2016). Key to ATSAP and its relationship with safety culture are that reports are de-identified so
the reporting employees are kept anonymous.
A Paradigm for Knowns and Unknowns
We tested two questions. First, can safety reports be classified according to whether the
hazard or risk was known or unknown to the controller or the system? The system is broadly
defined and encompasses the work environment including local facility management and
operations, air traffic control procedures and airspace, and airlines. Second, would classifying
reports yield useful safety information according to whether the reports represent safety issues
either known or unknown to either the controller or the system?
For the purpose of this paper, in a safety management system (SMS), what can be
considered as knowns and unknowns corresponds to what the front-line air traffic controller
understands juxtaposed to what the system understands. The controller’s understanding is based
upon expertise built on cumulative years of experience, knowledge of automated systems,
airspace, and operational procedures, controller training programs (initial and recurrent), reading
safety-related and other ATC informational materials, and discussing operational situations with
others. Controllers are professionals who continually take in and apply information to provide
the safest ATC service.
329

Understanding of knowns and unknowns by the system is based on integration of
complex types of information from many sources. Systems have been defined to “be people,
hardware, software, information, procedures, facilities, services, and other support facets which
are directly related to the organization’s aviation safety activities” (FAA, 2015). What is known
by one part of the system does not mean it is known throughout the system. People are part of
the system and include the supervisor and operations manager, controller-in-charge, other
controllers, airspace and training specialists, Technical Operations personnel (e.g., software
specialists), and pilots.
How the system is expected to operate is prescribed through procedures and inter-facility
letters of agreement with prescriptive instructions such as on airspace, communications, and
flight restrictions. Automated radar and flight data systems perform functions the controllers use
to ensure safe traffic flow and manage workload. Aircraft and avionics are designed, built, and
integrated according to standards and certification requirements, and flown by pilots certified
through training requirements.
Although the front-line controller is the person who first recognizes or deals with a safety
issue, the situation may be emergent and heretofore not previously encountered. Its nature,
origin, causal and contributing factors, and possible outcomes may not be understood especially
if it has not been directly encountered it before, i.e., it does not fit any known pattern.
The ATO and NATCA categorized safety issues as knowns and unknowns for the
controller and management based on over 130,000 ATSAP reports from 2010 through 2016
(2017). 100% of the reports were problems known to rank and file personnel. Of those, 75%
were problems known to supervisors. Of those, only 9% were problems known to middle
management, and of those, 4% were problems known to top management. Using our taxonomy
decision rules, these results can be interpreted to mean that 25% of the problems were unknown
to the system and 0% were unknown to controllers, as shown in Table 1.
Table 1. NATCA Reports Classifications.
System
Controller

Known
Unknown
Total

Known
75%
0%
75%

Unknown
25%
0%
25%

Total
100%
0%

Unknowns represent safety risks. What kinds of unknowns occur? Risk can result from
the system performing a function in a manner unknown to the controller. For example, Fort Hill
examined ATSAP reports associated with the en route automated handoff function (2012).
Review of system design specifications showed there were 17 ways that the automated handoff
feature could be manually discontinued for a flight being handed off from the transferring sector
and many controllers were not aware of those conditions. The controller was also not informed
that the aircraft would be handed off to the incorrect sector if the controller initiated the hand-off
just after entering the altitude. This poses that what is known to one part of the system (e.g.,
software designers) may not be known to other parts (e.g., front-line supervisors and trainers).
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Method
Our criteria for classification decisions are shown by our 2 x 2 table of knowns and
unknowns as shown in Table 2.

Unknown

Air Traffic Controller

Known

Table 2. Classification of Knowns and Unknowns Between Controllers and the System.
System
Known
Unknown
• Known to the controller such as
• Known to the controller such as
based on 7110.65, local agreements,
based on 7110.65, local
or training.
agreements, or training.
• Controller might say “I’ve seen that • Unknown to the system (e.g., pilot
before,” or “I’ve not seen that before
not aware of NOTAM change,
but other controllers have told me
local operational workaround,
about it.”
unexpected behavior of system or
equipment; unexpected outage,
• Known to the system as part of
information not included in design
design and operations (procedures,
or training documentation, etc.)
automation design documentation,
• System unknowingly changes or
automation expert knows of
interaction in software design,
removes information without
airspace layout, airline flight
understanding impacts or
operations information, etc.).
reverberations on the controller.
• System creates a threat or hazard
that the controller has to contend
with.
• Report states the condition was
unknown to management or other
system elements.
• Error of omission or commission.
• Report states the condition was
• Unknown to the controller (e.g.,
unexpected system action or
unknown to the controller.
response).
• Unknown to the controller (e.g.,
• Unknown to the system (e.g., pilot
unexpected system action or
not aware of NOTAM change,
response).
local operational workaround,
• Unexpected surprise to the
unexpected behavior of system or
controller.
equipment; unexpected outage,
• Known to the system as part of
information not included in design
design (procedures, automation
documentation, etc.)
documentation, automation expert
knows of interaction in software
design, airspace layout, airline flight
operations information, etc.).
• Not everything known by the system
is known by the controller, or known
throughout the system.
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Classification of an ATSAP Positive report as unknown to the controller was based on a
lack of information in the report that the controller knew of the issue before encountering it or
the report stated the controller did not know about it. Classification of an ATSAP Positive report
as unknown to the system was based in part on a lack of information contained in the report that
the facility knew of the issue until it was reported by the controller, the facility did not
demonstrate awareness until prompted by the report, and avoiding assuming awareness by
supervisor and other managers. The classification was based solely on the information contained
in the report. Assumptions were avoided about what might have been implied in the reports or
how the reports might have been prepared relative to policy, procedure, or process.
A sample of 36 ATSAP Positives reports were used in this study. There was no
identifying information about the controller(s) involved with the reports. A pilot test of the
method was applied to ten of the reports to assess the viability of the classification table and to
develop agreed upon stopping rules for the actual classification by the authors. The reports were
separately assessed and classified by the authors working independently. The classifications
were then compared and coding differences were resolved by discussion. Final classification
agreement was reached for all reports.
Results
Results of the classification are shown in Table 3 with 72% of the ATSAP Positives
reports involved safety issues known to the controller. The system was aware of 31% of the
issues.
Table 3. Results of ASTAP Reports Classifications.
System
Controller

Known
Unknown
Total

Known
17%
14%
31%

Unknown
55%
14%
69%

Total
72%
28%

Safety issues known to the controller but unknown to the system included different issues
with terminal procedures (e.g., instrument flight procedures used by the terminal controller were
refused by pilots because those procedures were not in their flight database, and a new missed
approach procedure took aircraft directly into the flow of traffic at another airport) and areas of
missing radio coverage.
Safety issues known to the system but unknown to the controller included controllers not
being informed of equipment outages and en route controllers not informed about special
approach procedures developed for one airline by Jeppesen and not being trained to read and
interpret those procedures. An example of an unknown to both the controller and the system
involved not fully understanding sector combine/de-combine en route automation so aircraft and
data tags would not be seen in the proper sector.
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Discussion
The purpose of this study was to develop and test a classification method for assessing
safety data based on a pattern of knowns and unknowns between the controller (human operator)
and the system (broadly defined). The data set used in this study was a set of safety reports called
ATSAP Positives. The method used stopping rules for making classification decisions using
information from the reports. Results showed that 17% of the safety issues shown in the ATSAP
Positive reports were known to both the controller and the system. Controllers may need to be
better informed about how automation works for different operational conditions as reflected by
both 28% of the safety issues being unknown to them and findings from the Fort Hill study. The
large percentages of safety issues unknown to the system reflect in part the complexity of
interdependencies between different parts of the system.
Limitations of this study include that the ATSAP Positives reports used are not current
and the procedures, automation, and training are different now so the identified issues and trends
have most likely been mitigated, with perhaps new issues and trends emerging. The amount and
quality of information found in the ATSAP Positives reports were considered in classification
decisions relative to the stopping rules as well as coding reconciliation between the authors.
Further work is needed to assess the approach using a larger sample of reports such as
from ASRS having more details. This method is not intended to replace current techniques for
detailed safety analysis but rather to understand trends in safety data from a different perspective.
Moreover, revealing patterns of unknowns can reveal potential system risks for mitigation.
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